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Abstract—This paper studies the feasibility of integrating a
community energy storage (CES) system with rooftop photo-
voltaic (PV) power generation for demand-side management of a
neighbourhood while maintaining the distribution network volt-
ages within allowed limits. To this end, we develop a decentralized
energy trading system between a CES provider and users with
rooftop PV systems. By leveraging a linearized branch flow model
for radial distribution networks, a voltage-constrained leader-
follower Stackelberg game is developed wherein the CES provider
maximizes revenue and the users minimize their personal energy
costs by trading energy with the CES system and the grid. The
Stackelberg game has a unique equilibrium at which the CES
provider maximizes revenue and the users minimize energy costs
at a unique Nash equilibrium. A case study, with realistic PV
power generation and demand data, confirms that the energy
trading system can reduce peak energy demand and prevent
network voltage excursions, while delivering financial benefits to
the users and the CES provider. Further, simulations highlight
that, in comparison with a centralized system, the decentralized
energy trading system provides greater economic benefits to the
users with less energy storage capacity.
Index Terms—Community energy storage, demand-side man-
agement, distribution network, game theory, photovoltaic power
generation, power flow, voltage regulation.
NOMENCLATURE
Sets and Indices
A, a Set of all users, user index.
N , n Set of non-participating users, user index.
P, p Set of participating users, user index.
T , t Set of all time intervals, time index.
V , i, j Set of buses (nodes), bus indices.
Ai Set of all users at bus i.
Ni Set of non-participating users at bus i.
Pi Set of participating users at bus i.
E Set of distribution lines (directed edges).
Ji Set of edges on the unique path from bus
0 to i.
U Feasible strategy set of the CES provider.
P+(t) Set of surplus energy users at time t.
P−(t) Set of deficit energy users at time t.
Yp(t) Feasible strategy set of user p ∈ P at
time t.
This work was supported by the Advancing Renewables Program,
Australian Renewable Energy Agency under Grant 2018/ARP134.
C. P. Mediwaththe and L. Blackhall are with the College of Engi-
neering and Computer Science, The Australian National University, Can-
berra, ACT 0200, Australia. e-mail: (chathurika.mediwaththe@anu.edu.au,
lachlan.blackhall@anu.edu.au).
Parameters and Constants
H Total number of time intervals in T .
M Number of participating users, |P|= M .
θ Small positive constant.
ηc, ηd Charging and discharging efficiencies of
the CES.
rij , xij Resistance, reactance of line (i, j) ∈ E .
φt, δt External grid price constants at time t.
Bmax, Bmin Maximum and minimum energy capacity
limits of the CES.
Erev,max, Efw,max Maximum reverse (rev) and forward (fw)
energy flow limits on the external grid.
Sij,max Apparent power rating of line (i, j) ∈ E .
Vmax, Vmin Maximum and minimum voltage magni-
tude limits of the distribution network.
λmin Constant lower price limit, λmin > 0.
γchmax, γ
dis
max Maximum charging and discharging
power rates of the CES.
da(t) Energy demand of user a ∈ A at time t.
dp(t) Energy demand of user p ∈ P at time t.
dn(t) Energy demand of user n ∈ N at time t.
gp(t) PV energy generation of user p ∈ P at
time t.
qa(t) Reactive power demand of user a ∈ A at
time t.
qp(t) Reactive power demand of user p ∈ P at
time t.
Functions and Variables
Pi, Qi Active and reactive power consumptions
of bus i.
Pij , Qij Active and reactive power flows from bus
i to j.
Vi Voltage magnitude of bus i.
Cp(·) Energy cost function of user p ∈ P .
Ws(·) Revenue function of the CES provider.
b(t) CES charge level at the end of time t.
eg(t) Energy traded between the external grid
and the CES at time t.
ep(t) Energy that user p ∈ P trades with the
external grid at time t.
es(t) Actual energy flowed into/out of the CES
at time t.
sp(t) Surplus energy at user p ∈ P at time t.
yp(t) Energy that user p ∈ P trades with the
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CES at time t.
E(t) Total external grid energy at time t.
EP(t) Total external grid energy of the users P
at time t.
EN (t) Total external grid energy of the users N
at time t.
E−p(t) Total external grid energy excluding ex-
ternal grid energy of user p at time t.
λg(t) External grid energy price at time t.
λs(t) CES provider’s energy price at time t.
Other notations
G Rooted tree in graph theory.
Γ Non-cooperative game of the users P .
Θ Stackelberg game between the CES
provider and the users P .
L Leader.
F Followers.
I. INTRODUCTION
The shift toward affordable electricity has increased the mar-
ket penetration of rooftop photovoltaic (PV) systems world-
wide. However, due to large-scale integration of rooftop PV
systems, low-voltage distribution networks frequently expe-
rience over-voltage conditions when PV generation exceeds
household demand. Distribution networks are also suscepti-
ble to voltage drops below permissible limits due to peak
electricity demand. Energy storage systems (ESSs) located
close to users have paved the way for developing effective
voltage regulation methods for distribution networks and for
developing demand-side management (DSM) methods to ac-
comodate peak energy demand without upgrading the existing
grid infrastructure [1]. With the close proximity to users,
community energy storage (CES) systems can be used to
develop innovative DSM approaches by exploiting rooftop PV
power generation. Additionally, CES systems can be utilized
to mitigate voltage excursions in distribution networks without
curtailing excessive PV power generation.
A DSM framework that utilizes a CES system with user-
owned PV power generation requires economic incentives
for all stakeholders including users and the storage provider.
Decentralized methods that can distribute the decision-making
to individuals are more preferable than centralized methods
since obtaining full access to users personal energy usage
information by a central entity in centralized DSM may be
difficult and less practical [2], [3]. Additionally, scheduling a
CES system by merely maximizing the economic benefits may
not be feasible in practice since the energy dispatch schedules
produced by such frameworks may violate critical network
constraints such as voltage limits in distribution networks.
In this paper, we study the extent to which a CES system can
mitigate voltage excursions in a distribution network with high
penetration of rooftop PV systems while performing DSM. To
this end, we develop a decentralized energy trading system
between a CES provider and users with rooftop PV systems.
In the system, users determine the energy amounts that can be
traded with the CES system and the grid by minimizing per-
sonal energy costs. Additionally, the CES provider maximizes
revenue by setting a price signal for the energy transactions
with the users and by determining the energy transactions with
the grid. The paper has the following key contributions:
• By leveraging a linearized branch flow model, a voltage-
constrained non-cooperative Stackelberg game is devel-
oped to study the decentralized energy trading between
the CES provider and the users while complying with the
voltage limits of a radial distribution network.
• We prove that the Stackelberg game has a unique
pure strategy Stackelberg equilibrium at which the CES
provider maximizes revenue and the users minimize per-
sonal energy costs at a unique Nash equilibrium.
Non-cooperative game theory has been exploited to develop
decentralized DSM frameworks that maximize economic ben-
efits to individual users by coordinating ESSs while satisfying
the network voltage constraints [4], [5]. For instance, a DSM
framework to maximize per-user economic benefits by coordi-
nating user-owned ESSs has been studied in [5] by developing
a voltage-constrained game among the users. In this context,
to the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to leverage
Stackelberg game theory with a branch power flow model
to study a decentralized energy trading framework between
a CES system and users with PV generation for DSM in a
neighborhood while satisfying the network voltage constraints.
This paper has a key difference to our previous work [6]. In
[6], the energy trading between the CES system and the users
has been studied by merely maximizing the economic benefits
for the storage provider and the users. In contrast, this work
studies the physical network integration of the energy trading
framework by explicitly taking into account the underlying
distribution network voltage constraints.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion II presents related work, and Section III presents the
system models of the energy trading system including the
distribution network power flow model. Section IV presents
the game-theoretic formulation of the system, and Section V
presents simulation results. Section VI concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
Scheduling ESSs to achieve DSM while complying with the
distribution network constraints has generally been studied as
an optimal power flow (OPF) problem. DSM-oriented OPF
problems, that can be effectively optimized by a central entity,
e.g., the distribution network operator, with the full system
information availability, have been extensively studied in lit-
erature [7]–[10]. For instance, the OPF-based DSM method
in [10] minimizes the total active power generation cost by
scheduling ESSs subject to network voltage constraints.
Decentralized methods have been explored by distributing
the power scheduling computation of the centralized OPF
problem to the local controllers at distributed ESSs and power
generators [3], [11]–[13]. For instance, in [3], a decentralized
scheme based on predictor corrector proximal multiplier al-
gorithm is proposed to solve a centralized OPF problem that
can be used to find the cost-optimal active and reactive power
set-points of ESSs in a microgrid. More recently, decentralized
peer-to-peer energy trading frameworks have been proposed to
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maintain the demand-supply balance in distribution networks
while ensuring the network voltages are within allowed limits
[14]–[16]. For instance, in [14], by combining a voltage sensi-
tivity analysis method with a distributed ledger technology, a
decentralized peer-to-peer energy trading scheme is proposed
to guarantee the energy transactions between users do not
violate voltage constraints in a radial distribution network.
In contrast to prior work, this paper studies a decentralized
energy trading framework between a CES system and users
with PV power generation by enabling the users and the CES
provider to selfishly maximize their economic benefits while
maintaining the network voltages within permissible limits.
III. SYSTEM MODELS OF THE ENERGY TRADING SYSTEM
The energy trading system comprises energy users and a
CES system as depicted in Fig. 1. The CES system is owned
by a third party, referred to as the CES provider, that provides
storage services [17]. This section first explains the demand-
side models, describing the roles of the energy users, followed
by the CES model, and the energy cost models. Then the
distribution network power flow model is presented. Before
integrating the demand-side and the CES models with the
network power flow model, a generic representation of energy
transactions among the key system entities, as shown in Fig. 1,
is used for the clarity of explaining the role of each entity.
A. Demand-side Model
The demand-side of the energy trading system comprises
two sets of users; participating users P and non-participating
users N , and A = P ∪ N . The households of the users P
are equipped with rooftop PV systems, operated at unity power
factor, without behind-the-meter ESSs. The users P consume
energy generated from their rooftop PV systems first to supply
energy demand. Then if there is an energy deficit, the users P
may decide to buy energy either from the external grid and/or
from the CES system. If there is surplus PV energy, the users
P may decide to sell some or all that energy to the CES system
in addition to selling to the external grid. Likewise, the users
P participate in the energy trading optimization framework,
and it is considered that the households of the users P are
equipped with controlling devices that make the energy trading
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Fig. 1. A representation of the energy transactions among the system entities.
decisions on their behalf. The users N do not participate in
the energy trading optimization framework and are considered
to be the traditional grid energy users without any local power
generation or energy storage. The retailer, as shown in Fig. 1,
acts as the middle-man between the external grid and the local
market and coordinates the external grid energy transactions
of the users A and the CES provider for billing purposes.
The time period, typically one day, is divided into H time
intervals with length ∆t, and T = {1, 2, · · · , H}. By consider-
ing the PV energy generation and energy demand fluctuations,
the users P are sub-divided into two time-dependent sets;
P+(t) and P−(t) such that P = P+(t) ∪ P−(t). We take
da(t) ≥ 0 for each user a ∈ A, and gp(t) ≥ 0 for each
user p ∈ P . Surplus energy at user p ∈ P is given by
sp(t) = gp(t)− dp(t). (1)
If sp(t) ≥ 0, then user p ∈ P+(t), and if sp(t) < 0, then
user p ∈ P−(t). Each user p ∈ P evaluates yp(t) based on
sp(t). These strategies are evaluated day-ahead by using the
day-ahead PV energy generation and demand forecasts, and
we assume that the users P have accurate forecasts. yp(t) > 0
if the user sells energy to the CES system, and yp(t) < 0 if
they buy energy from the CES system. It is specified that
0 ≤ yp(t) ≤ sp(t), if p ∈ P+(t), (2a)
sp(t) ≤ yp(t) ≤ 0, if p ∈ P−(t). (2b)
Additionally, ep(t) > 0 if user p ∈ P buys energy from the
external grid, and ep(t) < 0 if they sell energy to the external
grid. Then, from the energy balance at user p ∈ P ,
sp(t) = yp(t)− ep(t). (3)
B. Community Energy Storage Model
The CES provider computes eg(t) where eg(t) > 0 if they
buy energy from the external grid, and eg(t) < 0 if they sell
energy to the external grid. Given the energy trading decisions
yp(t) and eg(t) made by the users P and the CES provider,
respectively, actual energy flowed into/out of the CES system
at time t is calculated by
es(t) = eg(t) +
∑
p∈P
yp(t). (4)
In (4), if es(t) > 0, then the CES system is charging, and if
es(t) < 0, then the CES system is discharging. To satisfy the
storage charging/discharging power rates, it is required that
− γdismax ≤
es(t)
∆t
≤ γchmax, ∀t ∈ T . (5)
By taking 0 < ηc ≤ 1 and ηd ≥ 1, and by denoting the
energy charge level of the CES system at the beginning of
time t as b(t− 1), b(t) is given by
b(t) =
{
b(t− 1) + ηces(t), if es(t) ≥ 0,
b(t− 1) + ηdes(t), if es(t) < 0.
(6)
To ensure that the energy charge levels of the CES system
remain within the storage capacity limits, it is specified
Bmin ≤ b(t) ≤ Bmax, ∀t ∈ T . (7)
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Finally, to ensure the continuous operation of the CES
system for the next day and to avoid over-charging or over-
discharging of the CES system, it is considered that the initial
charge level b(0) would be approximately the same as the
charge level b(H) at the end of time H [18]. Then
|b(H)− b(0)| ≤ θ. (8)
C. Energy Pricing and Cost Models
In the system, the external grid energy price imposed by the
retailer at time t is given by
λg(t) = φtE(t) + δt (9)
where φt, δt > 0 can be obtained through a day-ahead
electricity market clearing process [18]. The dynamic price
function (9) is widely used in the smart grid literature and can
be used to encourage users to shift their peak energy demand to
non-peak hours [5], [18], [19]. E(t) = EP(t)+EN (t)+eg(t)
given that EP(t) =
∑
p∈P ep(t) and EN (t) =
∑
n∈N dn(t).
At time t, E(t) can be either positive or negative. For instance,
if EP(t) < 0, due to all users in P having positive surplus en-
ergy, i.e., sp(t) > 0, ∀p ∈ P , and if |EP(t)|> |EN (t)+eg(t)|,
then E(t) < 0. With the existence of negative E(t), the price
calculation in (9) can be negative. Hence, to ensure positive
grid prices at each time t, it is specified
λmin ≤ λg(t). (10)
Similar to [5], it is supposed that −Erev,max ≤ E(t) ≤ Efw,max
without overloading the distribution transformer.
The retailer adopts a one-for-one non-dispatchable energy
buyback scheme [20] where it applies the same price for both
selling and buying external grid energy transactions of the
users P and the CES provider. For instance, if user p ∈ P
buys ep(t) energy from the external grid, they incur an energy
cost of λg(t)ep(t) whereas if user p sells ep(t) energy to the
grid, then they receive λg(t)ep(t) payment from the retailer.
In the system, the CES provider sets a time-dependent price
λs(t) > 0 for the energy transactions between the users P and
the CES system. Then Cp(t) for user p ∈ P is given by
Cp(t) = λg(t)ep(t)− λs(t)yp(t). (11)
Since the CES provider trades energy eg(t) with the retailer
at price λg(t) and energy yp(t) with the users P at price λs(t),
their total revenue is given by
Ws =
H∑
t=1
(
− λs(t)
∑
p∈P
yp(t)− λg(t)eg(t)
)
. (12)
D. Distribution Network Power Flow Model
We consider integrating the demand-side and CES models
in Sections III-A and III-B with a radial distribution network
and employ the Distflow equations developed in [21] to model
the network power flow. For simplicity, time index t is omitted
in power and voltages in equations (13) - (14).
Consider a radial distribution network described by G =
(V, E) with V = {0, 1, · · · ,N} and E = {(i, j)} ⊂ V×V . Root
bus 0 represents the secondary of the distribution transformer
and is considered to be the slack bus. The natural radial
network orientation is considered where every distribution line
points away from bus 0 [13]. It is supposed that V0 is fixed
and known. The Distflow equations are given by, for each bus
j = {1, · · · ,N} and their parent bus i ∈ V ,
Pij = Pj +
∑
k:(j,k)∈E
Pjk + rij`ij , (13a)
Qij = Qj +
∑
k:(j,k)∈E
Qjk + xij`ij , (13b)
V 2j = V
2
i − 2(rijPij + xijQij) + (r2ij + x2ij)`ij (13c)
where `ij =
P 2ij+Q
2
ij
V 2i
. We exploit the linear approximation
of the power flow model (13) developed in [21]. The linear
approximation relies on the assumption that `ij = 0, and has
been extensively justified and used in power flow calculations
in radial distribution networks [4], [13]. The compact form of
the linearized Distflow equations is given by [13]
V = RP+XQ+ V 20 1 (14)
where V = (V 21 , · · · , V 2N )T, P = (P1, · · · , PN)T and Q =
(Q1, · · · , QN)T. Additionally, 1 is the N-dimensional vector of
all ones. R, X ∈ RN×N where Rij = −2
∑
(h,k)∈Ji∩Jj rhk,
Xij = −2
∑
(h,k)∈Ji∩Jj xhk, and Ji ⊂ E . It is required that
the vector of voltage magnitudes V in (14) to satisfy
Vmin ≤ V ≤ Vmax, ∀t ∈ T . (15)
In (15), Vmin ∈ RN×1 where all entries being V 2min and Vmax ∈
RN×1 where all entries being V 2max.
We consider, at each bus i ∈ V\{0}, Pi comprises the
total active power consumption and Qi comprises the total
reactive power consumption of both participating and non-
participating users at bus i, at time t. Additionally, if the
CES system is at bus i ∈ V\{0}, the CES active power
consumption, es(t)∆t , is also included in Pi. It is taken that
the PV and CES inverters operate at unity power factor.
Hence, if the CES system is at bus i ∈ V\{0}, then
Pi =
1
∆t
(
−∑p∈Pi sp(t)+∑n∈Ni dn(t)+es(t)). Otherwise,
Pi =
1
∆t
(
−∑p∈Pi sp(t)+∑n∈Ni dn(t)). Here, sp(t) can be
calculated by using (1). Additionally, Pi ⊂ P and Ni ⊂ N .
The reactive power consumption Qi in (14) can be calculated
by using Qi =
∑
a∈Ai qa(t) where Ai = Pi ∪Ni.
Remark 1. Power flows may be restricted by line flow limits
given by P 2ij + Q
2
ij ≤ S2ij,max, ∀(i, j) ∈ E [22]. These line
flow constraints can be included as quadratic constraints in
the optimization problem in Section IV-B which can then be
solved as a quadratically-constrained quadratic program [23].
IV. GAME-THEORETIC FORMULATION OF THE ENERGY
TRADING SYSTEM
The energy trading interactions between the CES provider
and the users P are studied using a non-cooperative Stack-
elberg game. Generally, in a Stackelberg game, one player
acts as the leader and moves first to make decisions, and the
rest of the players follow the leader’s decisions to make their
own decisions. Here, the CES provider acts as the leader and
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determines the optimal values for (λs(t), eg(t)). The users
P are the followers and determine the optimal values for
yp(t). We exploit the backward induction method [24] where
the followers’ actions, i.e., yp(t), are determined first using
the knowledge of leader’s actions, i.e., (λs(t), eg(t)), and
then the analysis proceeds backwards to determine the leader’s
actions.1 This process is explained in the next two subsections.
A. Objectives of the Participating Users
The primary objective of user p ∈ P is to minimize their
individual energy cost (11) at each time t ∈ T given feasible
values for (λs(t), eg(t)). By substituting (9) in (11) with (3),
(11) can be written as a quadratic function of yp(t) as
Cp(yp(t)) = K2yp(t)
2 +K1yp(t) +K0. (16)
Here, K2 = φt, K1 = −(φt(2sp(t)−E−p(t))− δt + λs(t)),
K0 = −λs(t)sp(t) with E−p(t) = EP\p(t) +EN (t) + eg(t).
EP\p(t) denotes total external grid energy of the other users
P\p, i.e., EP\p(t) = EP(t)− ep(t).
Since the cost function (16) depends on the actions of the
other users P\p, a non-cooperative game that can be played
by the users P at time t is formulated to determine the optimal
values for yp(t). The strategic form of the game among the
users P at time t is denoted by Γ ≡ 〈P, Y, C〉 where Y =∏
p∈P Yp(t) and C = {C1(t), · · · , CM (t)}. Here, Yp(t) is
subject to constraints (2). Suppose the CES energy transactions
profile of the users P at time t as y(t) = (y1(t), · · · , yM (t)),
and the CES energy transactions profile of the other users P\p
as yP\p(t) = (y1(t), · · · , yp−1(t), yp+1(t), · · · , yM (t)). Then
Cp(t) ≡ Cp(yp(t),yP\p(t)). At time t, user p ∈ P determines
y˜p(t) = argmin
yp(t) ∈ Yp(t)
Cn(yp(t), yP\p(t)). (17)
Proposition 1. The game Γ has a unique pure strategy Nash
equilibrium for any given feasible values of (λs(t), eg(t)).
Proof. At a Nash equilibrium, no user can benefit by unilat-
erally changing their own strategy while the other users play
their Nash equilibrium strategies [24]. Clearly, because φt > 0,
the second derivative of (16) with respect to yp(t) is positive
and therefore, (16) is strictly convex for given feasible strategy
profile of yP\p(t). Therefore, the objective function in (17) is
strictly convex. Also, the individual strategy sets Yp(t) are
compact and convex as they are subject to linear inequalities
(2) [23]. Thus, the existence of a unique Nash equilibrium
with pure strategies for the game Γ is guaranteed [25].
In the game Γ, the best response of each user p ∈ P for
given yP\p(t) is found by using
∂Cp(yp(t))
∂yp(t)
= 2K2y˜p(t) +K1 = 0. (18)
1To make the game-theoretic analysis tractable, in this paper, we assume
accurate forecasts of PV power generation and electricity demand, and the
perfect knowledge of player actions. To handle imperfect information from
inaccurate energy forecasts and from not having access to perfect knowledge
of actions of other players, an interesting future work can incorporate
stochastic game theory with imperfect information with the game-theoretic
energy trading framework [24].
Then to find the Nash equilibrium solutions, (18) is solved
for all users in P and that leads to solving M number of
simultaneous equations. Once these M equations are solved
with the expressions K2 and K1 in (16), the optimal response
of user p ∈ P at the Nash equilibrium y∗p(t) is given by
y∗p(t) = sp(t) + (t) (19)
where (t) = (M + 1)−1[φ−1t (λs(t) − δt) − EN (t) − eg(t)].
However, to form the Nash equilibrium of the game Γ,
y∗p(t) should also satisfy constraints (2). It can be seen that
y∗p(t) in (19) are functions of the CES provider’s strategies
(λs(t), eg(t)). Thus, any values for (λs(t), eg(t)) would not
guarantee that y∗p(t) satisfies constraints (2). Hence, to ensure
y∗p(t) satisfies (2) for each user p ∈ P , auxiliary constraints
(21) are considered in the revenue maximization problem of
the CES provider2 as described in the next subsection.
B. Objective of the Community Energy Storage Provider
As per backward induction, the aggregated Nash equilib-
rium CES energy amounts of the users P , i.e., ∑p∈P y∗p(t),
can be substituted in the revenue function (12) which can
then be written in terms of the CES provider’s actions
(λs(t), eg(t)). Then the CES provider’s revenue maximization
problem is to determine
ρ∗ = argmax
ρ ∈ U
H∑
t=1
(µ1λs(t)
2 + µ2λs(t) + µ3eg(t)
2 + µ4eg(t)),
(20a)
where constant coefficients, µ1, µ2, µ3, µ4, are given by
µ1 =
−M
φt (M + 1)
, (20b)
µ2 =
M
(M + 1)
(
EN (t) +
δt
φt
)
−
∑
p∈P
sp(t), (20c)
µ3 =
−φt
(M + 1)
, (20d)
µ4 =
−(φtEN (t) + δt)
(M + 1)
. (20e)
Additionally, the matrix of decision variables of the CES
provider ρ = (λs, eg) with λs = (λs(1), · · · , λs(H))T and
eg = (eg(1), · · · , eg(H))T. As realized in Section IV-A,
to ensure that y∗p(t) satisfies (2), the CES provider selects
(λs(t), eg(t)) at time t such that
−min[s(t)] ≤ (t) ≤ 0, if all P are surplus,
0 ≤ (t) ≤ −max[s(t)], if all P are deficit,
(t) = 0, if P has both types of users.
 (21)
where (t) is given in (19). min[s(t)] takes the minimum
value of the surplus energy profile of the users P , i.e,
2The consideration of the auxiliary constraints (21) in the CES provider’s
revenue optimization problem is a potential implementation where, depending
on the nature of the users P , the CES provider only needs to know the
maximum or the minimum surplus energy amount of the users P . In an
alternative method, in response to (λs(t), eg(t)), the users P may solve
their individual optimization problems (17) iteratively by incorporating the
constraints (2) until the Nash equilibrium is reached which requires additional
computation time for the iterative negotiation.
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s(t) = (s1(t), · · · , sM (t)), and max[s(t)] takes its maximum
value. The strategy set U is subject to constraints (5), (7),
(8), (10), (15) and (21). Since the Hessian is negative definite
for all ρ ∈ U as µ1, µ3 < 0, the objective function in
(20) is strictly concave. Additionally, U is non-empty, closed,
and convex as it is subject to linear constraints. Hence, the
optimization (20) has a unique solution [23].
Remark 2. The reasons for choosing the lower and upper
bounds of the constraints (21) are as follows; By comparing
(19) with (3), at the Nash equilibrium, (t) = ep(t) and that
gives us y∗p(t) = sp(t)+e
∗
p(t) with e
∗
p(t) being the traded grid
energy of user p ∈ P at the Nash equilibrium. If all users
in P are surplus users at time t, i.e., sp(t) ≥ 0, ∀p ∈ P ,
then to ensure constraint (2a) is satisfied, it is required that
0 ≤ y∗p(t) = (sp(t) + e∗p(t)) = (sp(t) + (t)) ≤ sp(t), ∀p ∈
P . Hence, the choice of (t) above −min[s(t)] and below
0 guarantees, (2a) is satisfied for all users in P . A similar
argument is applied when there are only deficit users at time
t, i.e, sp(t) < 0, ∀p ∈ P , where constraint (2b) has to be
satisfied. If time t has both types of users, e∗p(t) is set to zero,
and therefore, (t) = 0, so that y∗p(t) = sp(t),∀p ∈ P .
C. Non-cooperative Stackelberg Game
The strategic form of the non-cooperative Stackelberg game
between the CES provider and the users P is given as
Θ ≡ 〈{L,F}, {U ,Y}, {Ws, C}〉. Here, L is the CES provider,
and F are the users P . A suitable solution for the proposed
game Θ is the Stackelberg equilibrium in which the leader
attains their optimal price and grid energy given the follow-
ers’ equilibrium state. In game theory context, a Stackelberg
equilibrium is a stable solution at which none of the players,
i.e., the leader or any follower, can benefit by altering their
strategy unilaterally. Additionally, in non-cooperative games,
it is not always guaranteed to exist an equilibrium in pure
strategies [26]. Proposition 2 below along with Proposition 1 in
Section IV-A guarantees that there exists a unique Stackelberg
equilibrium in pure strategies for the energy trading game Θ.
Proposition 2. The game Θ has a unique pure strategy
Stackelberg equilibrium.
Proof. For given feasible (λs(t), eg(t)), the non-cooperative
game Γ has a unique Nash equilibrium for the energy trans-
actions yp(t) of the users P and that is given by y∗p(t)
(see Proposition 1). By incorporating
∑
p∈P y
∗
p(t), the CES
provider’s revenue maximization also has a unique solution as
proved in Section IV-B. Thus, as per backward induction, the
game Θ has a unique Stackelberg equilibrium (ρ∗,y∗) where
y∗ = (y∗(1), · · · ,y∗(H)), and y∗(t) is found by substituting
the tth element in ρ∗, i.e., ρ∗(t) = (λ∗s(t), e∗g(t)), in (19) for
each user n ∈ P [24].
Note that the equilibrium (ρ∗,y∗) of the game Θ satisfies
Cp(y
∗(t),ρ∗) ≤ Cp((yp(t),y∗P\p(t)),ρ∗),
∀p ∈ P,∀yp(t) ∈ Yp(t), ∀t ∈ T , (22)
Ws(y
∗,ρ∗) ≥Ws(y∗,ρ), ∀ρ ∈ U . (23)
In (22), y∗P\p(t) is the Nash equilibrium strategy pro-
file of the other users P\p at time t, i.e., y∗P\p(t) =
(y∗1(t), · · · , y∗p−1(t), y∗p+1(t), · · · , y∗M (t)).
To implement the game Θ, the CES provider solves (20)
and then, announces ρ∗ to the users P to find their Nash
equilibrium solutions using (19). To solve (20), the CES
provider needs to know the aggregated surplus energy of the
users P , i.e., ∑p∈P sp(t) to calculate the objective function
coefficient (20c) and to calculate es(t) for the constraints (5),
(7), (8), and (10) in U . Note that, from (3) and (4), es(t)
is a function of
∑
p∈P sp(t). Additionally, the CES provider
requires the information of the maximum or the minimum
surplus energy amount of the users P as required by (21),
and the aggregated surplus energy and the aggregated reactive
power demand of the users Pi, ∀i ∈ V , i.e.,
∑
p∈Pi sp(t) and∑
p∈Pi qp(t), as required by the voltage constraint (15). As
such, the disclosure of individual strategies or energy usage
information of the users P to the CES provider is not required.
V. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
We consider the realistic 7-bus radial feeder in [1] with
a 22/0.4 kV, 185 kVA distribution transformer (see Fig. 2).
It is considered that the feeder supplies 55 users and hence,
|A|= 55. As in [1], the secondary voltage of the transformer is
set at 1.0 p.u., and the maximum and minimum voltage limits
of the feeder are taken as 1.05 p.u. and 0.95 p.u., respectively.
The active power demand and PV power generation profiles
are chosen from a real dataset that includes 5-min PV power
and demand measurements of a set of residential users in
Canberra, Australia in 2018 [27]. For simulations in Sec-
tions V-A, V-B, and V-C, the daily PV power generation and
demand profiles of the 55 users are generated such that they
represent the average daily PV power and demand profiles of
the selected 55 users in Autumn 2018. For each user, 92 daily
PV and demand profiles were used to generate their average
daily PV and demand profiles in Autumn. Due to the lack of
realistic reactive power demand data, reactive power demand
of the users A is not considered. The total number of users at
each bus of the feeder is calculated in proportion to the PV
system allocation in [1]. For instance, to represent that the bus
6 does not have PV systems, randomly selected 5 users from
55 users are allocated to bus 6 assuming that they are the users
N . The rest of the 50 users are considered as the users P and
are allocated to other buses as shown in Fig. 2. Additionally,
∆t = 5/60 hrs, H = 288, Bmax = 700 kWh, γchmax = γ
dis
max =
150 kW, ηc = 0.98, ηd = 1.02, Bmin = 0.05Bmax. δt is set as
a constant equal to the average price of a reference two-step
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Fig. 2. One line diagram of the radial feeder. |Pi| - Number of participating
users at bus i, |Ni|- Number of non-participating users at bus i.
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time-of-use (TOU) price signal in [28] where the peak period
is 07.00-23.00 (time intervals 85-276). φt is selected such that
φpeak
φoff-peak
=
Pricepeak,ref-TOU
Priceoff-peak, ref-TOU
= 2.12. Then φoff-peak is set such
that the difference between the peak and the off-peak prices
of the reference TOU signal is equal to the difference between
the predicted maximum grid price in the peak hours and the
minimum grid price in the non-peak hours of the system. λmin
is set at the reference TOU off-peak price 18.5 AU cents/kWh.
As realized in Section IV-B with backward induction, the
CES provider’s theoretical optimal revenue at the Stackelberg
equilibrium can be obtained by optimizing (20). Hence, in
our simulations, to obtain the Stackelberg equilibrium of the
game Θ, first, (20) was solved for ρ∗ using the interior point
algorithm in MATLAB fmincon solver, and then the elements
ρ∗(t) = (λ∗s(t), e∗g(t)) were substituted in (19) to obtain y∗.
All simulations were conducted using MATLAB and a laptop
with 2.7 GHz Intel Core i7 processor and 16 GB RAM.
Under these settings, the computation time for finding ρ∗ in
simulations in Section V-A was 66.8 seconds.
A. Impact on Voltage Profiles and Energy Costs
Here, the impacts of the energy trading system on the bus
voltages and the economic benefits for the CES provider and
the users are compared with a baseline without a CES system.
In the baseline, the users P trade energy only with the external
grid through the retailer at price λg(t) in (9). In the energy
trading system, the CES system is placed at bus 7 in Fig. 2.
Before the time 105 and after the time 209, all users in
P are deficit users with little or zero PV energy generation,
and that results in positive aggregate energy consumptions at
each bus with the baseline as shown in Fig. 3(a). Fig. 4(a)
depicts, in the baseline, the aggregate positive electricity load
on the external grid is greatest between times 216 and 281.
Simultaneously, the voltages at buses 3 - 7 drop below the
lower limit 0.95 p.u. causing under-voltages (see Fig. 3(b)),
and the lowest voltage 0.908 p.u. occurs at bus 7. As per Fig. 5,
in the energy trading system, the users P buy more energy
from the CES than from the external grid (|∑p∈P yp(t)|>
|EP(t)|) to supply their peak energy demand after the time
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Fig. 3. (a) Aggregate bus energy consumptions and (b) bus voltages with the
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Fig. 5. Energy transactions in the energy trading system.
209. Consequently, the CES system discharges (es(t) < 0),
and the voltages at all buses remain within limits as shown
in Fig. 6(b). Additionally, the total afternoon peak demand on
the external grid is reduced by nearly 64% (from 5.69 kWh to
2.02 kWh) compared to the baseline as depicted in Fig. 4(a).
At midday, between times 106 and 208, PV energy is
plentiful, and nearly all users in P have positive surplus
energy. Hence, each bus experiences negative aggregate energy
consumptions in the baseline expect bus 6 where only non-
participating users exist (see Fig. 3(a)). Consequently, buses
1 - 7 experience over-voltages in the baseline as shown in
Fig. 3(b). In particular, the highest voltage 1.165 p.u. occurs
at bus 7 with the greatest negative energy consumption. In
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Fig. 6. (a) Aggregate bus energy consumptions and (b) bus voltages with the
energy trading system.
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the energy trading system, between times 106 and 208, the
users P sell nearly all of their positive surplus energy to the
CES and that leads to the charging mode of the CES system
(es(t) > 0) (see Fig. 5). As a result, the energy consumption at
bus 7, i.e., −∑p∈P7 sp(t) + es(t), becomes positive between
times 121 and 192 as depicted in Fig. 6(a). This helps regulate
the voltages at all buses below the threshold 1.05 p.u during
the over-voltage period as shown in Fig. 6(b). Note that, in
Figs. 3(a) and 6(a), the energy consumption profiles at buses
3 and 5 are the same because there are no users at bus 3.
Additionally, in Figs. 3(b) and 6(b), the voltage profiles at
buses 4 and 6 closely follow each other due to the negligible
voltage drop between the two buses.
The reduced external grid load E(t) before time 105 and
after time 209 leads to reduced grid prices λg(t) compared to
the baseline as shown in Fig. 4(b). Consequently, the average
cumulative daily energy cost of the users P is reduced by 83%
(from 160 AU cents to 27 AU cents). Additionally, the CES
provider receives a cumulative revenue of 7376 AU cents in
the energy trading system. Due to the reduced grid price, the
average daily cost for the users N is reduced by 17% (from
723 AU cents to 597 AU cents).
B. Voltage Constraints on the Energy Trading System
Here, we investigate the impacts of the energy trading
schedules determined with and without the voltage constraint
(15) in the game-theoretic optimization in Section IV. The
same simulation setup as in Section V-A is used.
As shown in Fig. 7, without the voltage constraints in the
optimization, the voltages at all buses remain within the limits
except bus 5. Note that in Fig. 7, the voltages at buses 4 and
6 closely follow each other due to the negligible voltage drop.
Once the voltage constraints are introduced, the voltages at
all buses fall within the limits as shown in Fig. 6(b). With
the voltage constraints, more energy is drawn by the CES
system (es(t) > 0) at midday than in the system without the
voltage constraints and this, in turn, mitigates over-voltages of
all buses including bus 5. The users P follow nearly the same
energy trading strategies,
∑
p∈P yp(t) and EP(t), despite the
voltage constraints. Additionally, the CES provider pays a
higher price at midday for buying surplus PV energy from the
users P when the voltage constraints are introduced. Hence,
the average cumulative daily energy cost for the users P in the
system with the voltage constraints (27 AUD cents) is reduced
by 50% compared to the system without the voltage constraints
(52 AUD cents). However, the CES provider’s revenue reduces
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Fig. 7. Bus voltages without the voltage constraint in the optimization.
by 9% in the system with the voltage constraints (from 8091
AUD cents to 7376 AUD cents) as a result of paying a higher
price for buying energy from the users P at midday.
C. Comparison with a Centralized Energy Trading System
Here, we compare the performance of the game-theoretic
energy trading system in Section IV with a centralized system.
In the centralized system, the CES provider schedules the en-
ergy transactions eg(t) and yp(t) by minimizing the total cost
paid by the entire community, i.e., the users A and the CES
provider, to the retailer. Hence, its objective is to minimize∑H
t=1 λg(t)E(t) subject to constraints (2), (5), (7), (8), (10),
and (15). In the centralized system, the objective function does
not include a price signal for the energy transactions yp(t)
between the CES system and the users P . The centralized
system serves as a baseline and is a potential implementation
for the energy trading between the CES system and the users
P . The simulation parameters are chosen as in Section V-A.
As shown in Fig. 8, in the centralized system, the CES
provider sells more energy to the external grid (eg(t) < 0)
before time 105 and after time 209 compared to the game-
theoretic system. This leads to a greater reduction of the total
grid load E(t)(= EP(t)+EN (t)+eg(t)) and hence, a greater
reduction of the price λg(t). At midday, the users P sell
nearly all their positive surplus PV energy to the CES in both
systems (see Fig. 5 and Fig. 8). However, the users P in the
centralized system make nearly a zero income at midday with
no price being offered to their CES energy transactions yp(t).
With the CES price λs(t), the users P in the game-theoretic
system make a positive income by selling PV energy to the
CES system at midday. Hence, in the centralized system, the
average cumulative daily energy cost for the users P only
reduces by 11% whereas in the game-theoretic system, they
receive nearly 83% average cost reduction compared to the
baseline without the CES system demonstrated in Section V-A.
Similar to the game-theoretic system (as shown in Fig. 6(b)),
in the centralized system, the lowest voltage (0.96 p.u) occurs
in bus 7 and the highest voltage (1.04 p.u.) occurs in bus 5 at
midday. As shown in Fig. 9, the CES system saturates at Bmax
in the centralized system as a result of more energy drawn by
the CES system (es(t) > 0) at midday. Consequently, the
lowest voltage in the centralized system becomes 2% less
than that of the game-theoretic system (0.98 p.u.), and the
highest voltage in the centralized system becomes 0.9% less
than that of the game-theoretic system (1.05 p.u.). However,
Fig. 9 illustrates that the centralized system requires a larger
energy storage capacity to this end.
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Fig. 8. Energy transactions in the centralized system.
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D. Impacts of Seasonal Changes in Demand and PV Power
Profiles on the Energy Trading System
Here, the energy trading system performance is evaluated
by changing the average daily PV power and demand pro-
files of the 55 users by season; summer, autumn, winter,
and spring. The seasonal profiles were generated using the
corresponding demand and PV power measurements in [27].
Here, Bmax = 950 kWh, γchmax = γ
dis
max = 300 kW so that
the CES system can accommodate energy transactions without
saturating at those limits when using the average demand and
PV power profiles of all four seasons. All the other parameters
are as in Section V-A. For comparison, the baseline without
the CES system in Section V-A is used. To demonstrate the
variations of seasonal aggregate bus energy consumptions, we
include Fig. 10 that depicts the seasonal aggregate energy
consumptions at bus 7 with the baseline.
Fig. 11 depicts the boxplots of 24-hr voltage distributions
of all buses when the average demand and PV power profiles
are changed by season. The horizontal bars of the whiskers
represent the maximum and the minimum voltages experi-
enced by the feeder in the 24-hr period. As illustrated in
Fig. 11(a), in the baseline, with summer profiles, the feeder
experiences the highest over-voltage condition, 1.19 p.u. at bus
7, due to the greatest negative energy consumption at midday.
Additionally, the highest under-voltage condition, 0.84 p.u. at
bus 7, is experienced in winter with the greatest positive energy
consumption by the users in the afternoon as shown in Fig. 10.
The energy trading system is capable of bringing the voltages
within the limits for all seasons as shown in Fig. 11(b).
Fig. 12 compares the normalized average cumulative energy
cost of the users P and the normalized CES provider revenue
in four seasons. As shown in Fig. 12(a), in winter, the users P
incur the highest positive energy cost in both baseline and the
proposed energy trading systems. This is because, in winter,
the users buy more energy than selling due to having the
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greatest energy demand with less PV power generation. In
summer, due to having plenty of excessive PV power, the users
P generate the highest revenue (negative cost) by selling PV
power, and the users P receive more revenue in the energy
trading system than in the baseline. In Fig. 12(b), the CES
provider’s revenue is presented only for the energy trading
system as there is no CES system in the baseline. Because the
users P buy more energy from the CES system in winter, the
CES provider receives the greatest revenue in winter, whereas,
in summer, due to selling more PV energy by the users P to
the CES system, the CES provider receives the least revenue.
VI. CONCLUSION
With the ability to locate close to users, community energy
storage (CES) systems can be utilized to deliver demand-side
management and voltage support for low-voltage distribution
networks. In this paper, we have investigated the extent to
which a CES system can reduce voltage excursions and peak
energy demand of a radial distribution network by developing
a decentralized energy trading system between a CES system
and the users with rooftop photovoltaic (PV) power generation.
By employing a linearized branch flow model, a voltage-
constrained Stackelberg game was developed where the CES
provider and users can maximize their personal economic
benefits. It has been shown that the energy trading system
can deliver significant peak energy demand reduction and
economic benefits for both the CES provider and the users
while satisfying the network voltage limits.
Future work includes developing a stochastic model to
incorporate uncertainties of demand and PV power generation
and imperfect knowledge from players’ actions in the energy
trading system, exploring the energy trading system operation
to accommodate the possibility of unbalanced conditions in
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three-phase distribution networks, and extending the system to
incorporate the PV and CES inverter reactive power control.
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